Interactive AI security framework

The New Perimeter is an atlas of agent behavior.

The perimeter is not a network edge. It is the boundary around what an agent can read, infer, call, generate, and leak. Use the seven surfaces below to map enterprise AI risk before it becomes an incident.

Thesis

Your AI perimeter is wherever an agent can read, decide, act, or leak.

Why it matters

Agents collapse identity, context, tools, runtime, output, and egress into one delegated actor.

Monday action

Map your highest-impact AI workflow against all seven surfaces before approving another tool integration.

Attack-surface atlas

Click a surface. See what fails. Close the loop.

Each surface maps to an attacker path, an enterprise control, and an assessment deliverable.

01 / Instruction surface

Prompts, hidden policy, system messages, and tool descriptions shape agent behavior.

What attackers do

Smuggle instructions through content the agent treats as context.

What closes it

Instruction provenance, tool-policy separation, prompt-injection tests, and refusal evidence.

IMS deliverable

Instruction-control review and adversarial prompt path report.

Why the old perimeter failed

Network boundaries do not describe delegated action.

The meaningful question is no longer “is this request inside or outside the network?” It is “what can this agent infer, retrieve, decide, call, create, and leak?” That is a different security model. It requires identity discipline, tool scoping, context hygiene, runtime isolation, output review, and egress controls around every agentic workflow.

Assessment evidence

What “secure the agent” becomes in practice.

The framework is only useful when it produces evidence: inventory, attack paths, controls, owners, and board-ready decisions.

Sample finding

Indirect prompt injection can move from context to tool call.

A support agent reads a customer attachment, retrieves internal policy, opens a CRM record, and drafts a privileged update. The failure is not one prompt. It is a context-to-action chain.

Untrusted docRAG contextMCP toolCRM actionEgress
Control

Agent Trust Gate

Identity, context provenance, tool scope, runtime boundary, and output review before action.

Deliverable

Board memo

Risk language leadership can use without reading exploit traces.

Control model

From Zero Trust to Agent Trust.

Control question
Traditional perimeter
Agentic enterprise
Who acts?
Human user or application identity
Agent identity with delegated authority and policy-bound tools
What is trusted?
Network segment, device posture, session
Instruction source, context provenance, tool scope, runtime boundary
How failure shows up
Unauthorized access or lateral movement
Prompt injection, tool abuse, data exfiltration, unreviewed action
What proves control
Access logs and policy enforcement
Agent action audit, context lineage, red-team results, egress evidence
0–30 days

Inventory

Find agents, copilots, RAG systems, MCP servers, AI vendors, and workflows with tool access.

31–60 days

Control

Assign owners, narrow scopes, isolate runtimes, define logging, and set acceptable use boundaries.

61–90 days

Test and brief

Run adversarial testing, produce a board-ready risk map, and fund the remediation roadmap.

Assessment CTA

Turn the atlas into your enterprise map.

IMS assesses your AI estate against the seven surfaces and produces a prioritized, board-ready control roadmap.

Request assessment